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Abstract
Bank transaction fraud results in over $13B annual losses for
banks, merchants, and card holders worldwide. Much of this
fraud starts with a Point-of-Compromise (a data breach or
a ”skimming” operation) where credit and debit card digital
information is stolen, resold, and later used to perform fraud.
We introduce this problem and present an automatic Points-
of-Compromise (POC) detection procedure. BreachRadar
is a distributed alternating algorithm that assigns a proba-
bility of being compromised to the different possible loca-
tions. We implement this method using Apache Spark and
show its linear scalability in the number of machines and
transactions. BreachRadar is applied to two datasets with
billions of real transaction records and fraud labels where
we provide multiple examples of real Points-of-Compromise
we are able to detect. We further show the effectiveness of
our method when injecting Points-of-Compromise in one of
these datasets, simultaneously achieving over 90% precision
and recall when only 10% of the cards have been victims of
fraud.
1 Introduction
FICO estimates European losses to fraud at e 1.6 billion
in 2014 [7] and global fraud in 2013 was estimated at
$13.9 billion [16]. If the cost of lost merchandise as well
as redistribution costs are included, fraud is estimated
to account for 1.32% of the revenue for the average
merchant in the US and it’s higher if the merchant
operates globally [14].
A Point-of-Compromise (POC) is a (physical or
virtual) location of the payment network, such as an
ATM or a point-of-sales terminal, that processed or col-
lected payment information and that was compromised
by fraudsters. In a classical scenario, the victim’s card
is swiped in a small rogue device (possibly installed in
an ATM or vending machine, or used by malicious em-
ployees whenever the card leaves the owners’ sight at a
bar, restaurant or gas station) that reads and stores the
magnetic stripe data which is then, e.g., sold and writ-
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ten on a new cloned card. However, this is not the only
scenario: data breaches are also common POCs which
might occur at the merchant or even payment-processor
level.
Given the increase in both the number of data
breaches and in the number of cards affected (Target’s
2013 data breach alone exposed an estimate of 40 million
cards [13]), early and accurate detection of POCs is not
only vital for fraud prevention, but could also lead to
a decrease in the expected loss from these breaches,
reducing their frequency. The timely discovery of a
Point-of-Compromise could prevent the fraudulent use
of other cards compromised at the same location and
early detection could prevent thousands of fraud cases.
As an example, Figure 1a illustrates the weekly sav-
ings when BreachRadar is applied to one of the two
real datasets we explore. By automatically canceling
cards that were used in locations marked as potentially
compromised, and even after assuming a $10 reissue cost
per card, our system is able to prevent over $2 million
USD in credit-card fraud in a period of just 6 weeks.
The main contributions of this paper can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. Point-of-Compromise Problem. We formulate
a novel and important POC detection problem.
2. Effectiveness. BreachRadar accurately identi-
fies Points-of-Compromise, achieving over 90% pre-
cision and recall when only 10% of the stolen cards
have been used in fraud (Figure 1b).
3. Distributed POC-Detection algorithm. We
provide a scalable distributed algorithm for POC
detection in big datasets (Figure 1c).
Further Applications. While we focus on the
identification of Points-of-Compromise in bank trans-
actions, there are other domains where BreachRadar
could help identify malicious or abnormal activity. We
invite the reader to consider any situation where in-
dividual nodes might trigger abnormal behavior in
their neighbors. Consider anti-virus applications and
machine-file bipartite graphs: given malware symptoms
in some of the machines, a small set of files that exist in
common could be formulated as Point-of-Compromise
detection problem. Similarly, quick identification of
food-poisoning sources or of faulty parts in the car in-
dustry can be formulated under this setting.
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Figure 1: BreachRadar is fast and effective.
2 Background and Related Work
While apparently a simple problem, several reasons
compound to make the automatic detection of POCs a
challenge to naive approaches: a) the variety of Points-
of-Compromise, e.g., database breaches, card skimming
devices, etc; b) the variety of time granularities, e.g.
database breaches compromise months of transactions,
while an employee skimming cards might do it for
a single day; c) the lack of ground-truth labels, as
fraudulent charge reports do not identify the origin of
the compromise and d) the scale of the problem, as
datasets with billions of transactions with millions of
possible Points-of-Compromise are common.
2.1 Summary Table 1 characterizes the most rele-
vant methods described in this section. We analyze a
method’s ability to find Points-of-Compromise and to
scale at least quasilinearly with the number of trans-
actions that need to be processed. We consider that
a method has proper risk assessment if it doesn’t be-
lieve that more transactions to safe merchants reduce
the probability that the card might have been stolen at
a single compromised location. We consider methods
to be Blame-aware if they acknowledge that cards are
likely stolen only once, so they should not significantly
contribute to an increased POC likelihood of multiple
locations. We consider a method to be Confidence-
aware if it incorporates the idea that more evidence
improves the confidence of a POC label1. Finally, a
method is capable of Early Detection if it shows high
recall even when only a small percentage (e.g., 10%) of
the cards at a location are fraud-cards (a card with at
least one fraudulent transaction).
1As an example, we are more confident that a location has
been compromised if 200 out of 600 cards who transacted there
were victims, than if 3 out of 6 were.
2.2 Real-time Fraud Detection While not able
to identify Points-of-Compromise, state-of-the-art fraud
detection solutions merge statistical, machine learning
and data mining tools in order to create models that
estimate the fraud probability of individual transactions
in real-time. For further information on this orthogonal
problem, we refer the reader to specific literature [4, 5].
2.3 Points-of-Compromise Simple metrics are un-
able to provide an appropriate measure for the like-
lihood of a point being the origin of a compromise.
Ranking locations by the number of fraud-cards with
which they interacted does not work, as many mer-
chants process many transactions and thus interact with
a high number of fraud-cards. The ratio of fraud-cards
shouldn’t be used either, as the majority of the locations
have small numbers of transactions and high ratios (by
chance) do not imply a compromised location.
Current systems for Point-of-Compromise detec-
tion are typically hindered by these issues. Abso-
lute number of fraud-cards and fraud-card ratios are
commonly used [11, 18], perhaps coupled with time-
windows [22] to restrict the set of transactions con-
sidered. Arbitrary thresholds that indicate whether
a merchant was compromised need to be defined, but
suggestions have been made that supervised classifica-
tion algorithms could also be trained, after information
about which merchants were in fact compromised is ob-
tained [8]. A different approach suggests comparing re-
cent fraud-rates at each merchant with their historical
fraud-rate and flagging outlier deviations [24].
2.4 Guilt-by-association Semi-supervised learning
techniques, in particular graph-based methods such as
Label Propagation, could be used to label nodes as com-
promised or not-compromised in the network; labeled
nodes influence neighbors according to an Homophily
Matrix which establishes whether nearby nodes tend to
Table 1: Comparison of BreachRadar with other methods. Properties are described in Section 2.
BreachRadar Ratio Ratio + Prior Belief Propagation Vertex Cover Real-time Detection
Finds POCs ! ! ! ! !
Scalability ! ! ! ! !
Risk assessment ! ! ! !
Blame-aware ! !
Confidence-aware ! !
Early Detection !
have similar or opposite labels. Some variations extend
Label Propagation to incorporate label confidence and
prior information, which could be used when only posi-
tive labels (fraud) are observed [21].
However, both methods have the underlying as-
sumption that more connections to innocent nodes im-
ply a smaller likelihood that the node has been com-
promised; this idea is at the core of guilt-by-association
algorithms: similarly to how connections to fraudulent
nodes increase the probability of a node being fraud-
ulent, then connections to safe locations decrease this
probability. For this problem, we know that the oppo-
site is true: connections to innocent merchants do not
compensate for the fact that a connection to a compro-
mised location exists. Our results showing Belief Prop-
agation’s low performance corroborate this intuition.
2.5 Vertex Cover This problem can also be formu-
lated as a vertex cover problem in bipartite graphs:
given a set of cards who were victim of fraud, we would
like to identify the smallest subset S of adjacent nodes
(i.e., merchants) so that every card who has been a vic-
tim has at least one adjacent location in S. Unfortu-
nately, this formulation is NP-hard2. Nevertheless, in
Section 6.5 we evaluate a greedy approximation: on
each iteration, we consider as compromised the loca-
tion with the highest number of adjacent fraud-cards,
remove them from the bipartite graph and repeat.
3 The POC Problem
We assume the point-of-view of a payment network
or card issuer who has visibility over the majority
of the transactions of a set of cards, some of which
have been identified as fraud-cards (these are typically
canceled and reissued). Loosely speaking, our goal is
to automatically identify a small set of locations that
many fraud-cards have in common.
We represent the set of transactions as a bipartite
graph with cards on one side and possible Points-of-
2This can be easily shown through reduction to Minimum Set
Cover, one of Karp’s 21 NP-complete problems [9].
Compromise on the other.
A possible Point-of-Compromise is a feature that a
subset of transactions have in common, such as a specific
point-of-sale terminal, a store identifier or a merchant
name (i.e. all the stores from a corporation). In prac-
tice, we would also like to incorporate time as a feature
as data breaches and skimming devices temporally cor-
relate transactions: in Section 6, we consider terminal-
week pairs as possible Points-of-Compromise, but many
other options (or combinations thereof) are admissi-
ble. For simplicity, we use the terms possible Point-of-
Compromise and location interchangeably. Edges con-
nect two nodes if there is a transaction between a given
card and a given location.
3.1 Problem Definition Let’s consider C to be the
set of all cards and L to be the set of all locations.
G = (C ∪L, E) is the bipartite graph and for every edge
(i, j) ∈ E ⇒ i ∈ C and j ∈ L.
We will always use index i to represent cards
and index j to represent locations. Li is the set of
neighboring locations of card i and Nj is the set of
neighboring cards of location j.
f : C → {0, 1}, part of our input, is a function
indicating whether a given card c ∈ C was a victim of
fraud or not.
B is a |C| × |L| matrix where bij is the probability
that j is the location responsible for i being a fraud-
card, or the blame which card i attributes to possible
POC j.
Using this notation (summarized in Table 2), the
POC detection problem can be formulated as:
Problem 1. (Spotting Points-of-Compromise)
• Given: A graph G = (C ∪ L, E) and fraud labels
f : C → {0, 1}.
• Find:
– θ : L → [0, 1], where θj is the probability that
location j is a Point-of-Compromise;
– B : C × L → [0, 1], where bij is the blame that
card i assigns to location j.
Table 2: Notation, symbols and definitions
Symbol Definition
C Set of all cards
L Set of locations (possible POCs)
G Graph of cards and locations
Li Set of locations neighboring card i
Nj Set of cards neighboring location j
fi Boolean indicating if i is a fraud-card
θ Vector of POC probabilities.
B Blame matrix
bi A row of matrix B
bij A cell of matrix B
4 POC-detection Algorithm
We describe a novel algorithm for the identification of
Points-of-Compromise following a simple Bayesian in-
ference approach. We adopt the principle that predic-
tions are inherently uncertain and require more evidence
in order to increase their confidence, and assume that
cards are compromised at a single location and should
influence each other towards agreeing on the (locally)
most likely mutual Point(s)-of-Compromise.
4.1 A POC Hierarchical Model We start by as-
suming that whether a location has been compromised
is represented by pj , a Bernoulli random variable whose
success probability θj is taken from a Beta distribution
(its conjugate prior).
From the card perspective, we assume that each
fraud-card has an associated variable ri taken from a
categorical distribution of size |Li| and probability vec-
tor bi, where each element bij of bi is linearly propor-
tional to the respective θj compromise probability. This
means we are implicitly assuming that the probability
of a card blaming a location is linearly proportional to
the probability of it being a POC.
This model can be formally defined as follows:
θj ∼ Beta(α, β)(4.1)
bij =
{
θj∑
k∈Ni
θk
if fi = 1 and j ∈ Li
0 otherwise
(4.2)
ri ∼ Categorical(|Li|,bi)(4.3)
whose corresponding graphical model in plate notation
can be seen in Figure 2. The only hyper-parameter
of this formulation is the Beta distribution which is
encoded using α and β. Intuitively, α and β control how
much evidence we need to be confident that a location
has really been compromised.
The inputs of this model are the sets Li (the
locations with which each card interacted) and the
α β
θ
|Li|
r f
|L|
|C|
Figure 2: Plate notation of the probabilistic
graphical model. The blames bij are a direct func-
tion of θ and f and are omitted for clarity.
boolean indicators fi on whether a card has been
a victim. Note the direct relationship between the
problem definition and this formulation: the probability
that a location j has been compromised can be obtained
directly from the expected value of pj (E[pj ] = θj) and
the blames attributed by the different cards are encoded
in the row-normalized matrix B.
In the following, we will describe an alternating
algorithm to simultaneously find θ and B.
4.2 From Blames to POC Probabilities Let’s
suppose that we knew B, i.e., we knew how much blame
each card attributes to each possible POC. Ideally, we
would then like to find θ that maximizes P [θ|B], as
our model relates the probability of being compromised
with the blames attributed.
We defined that θj comes from a Beta(α, β) distri-
bution, therefore we know that:
(4.4) P [θj ;α, β] =
θα−1j (1− θj)
β−1
B(α, β)
,
where the beta function B(α, β) is simply the normal-
ization constant that ensures that the total probability
integrates to 1.
Let zj =
∑
i bij be the sum of all the blames
assigned to location j. zj follows a Beta-Binomial
distribution and we know that
(4.5) P [zj|θj ; |Nj |] ∝ θ
zj
j (1− θj)
|Nj |−zj
and, from Bayes’ theorem, the posterior distribution
equals
(4.6)
P [θj |zj;α, β, |Nj |] ∝ P [zj |θj ; |Nj |]P [θj ;α, β] ∝
∝ θ
zj+α−1
j (1− θj)
|Nj |+β−zj−1
This means that the posterior probability distribu-
tion of θj is defined as another Beta distribution that
can be parametrized as Beta(zj + α, |Nj | − zj + β) and
with expected value
(4.7) E[θj ] =
zj + α
|Nj |+ α+ β
We can think of this expected value as a ratio of the
blames (zj) to the total number of cards that used this
location (|Nj |), with additional terms α and β that rep-
resent, respectively, “virtual” fraud-cards that used this
location (α) and “virtual” non-fraud-cards that used
this location (β). Depending on the Beta(α, β) prior
chosen, two possible POCs with the same fraud-cards
ratio will have their probability adjusted to match our
confidence on how far away from the prior distribution
they are. The ratio
α
α+ β
represents the expected prob-
ability that a random location is compromised, while
the magnitude of α and β encode our confidence on this
prior.
4.3 From POC Probabilities to Blames Follow-
ing a similar line of reasoning, let’s suppose that we
knew θ and that we would like to find B, i.e. we would
like to know the probability that a card will blame each
location, given their respective compromise probabili-
ties.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, we assume that blam-
ing probabilities are linearly proportional to compro-
mise probabilities. Therefore, the blames matrix B can
be found by directly applying Equation 4.2.
4.4 An Alternating Algorithm We previously de-
fined the probability that a location was compromised
based on the blames assigned to it, and defined the
blame assigned by a card to a possible POC given the
compromise probabilities of all the locations in Equa-
tion 4.2. This tight coupling suggests an alternating
algorithm in which one updates blames and POC prob-
abilities in succession until convergence.
We initialize blames as uniformly distributed across
all neighboring possible POCs, and proceed by updating
the POC probabilities and blames in sequence. We
check for convergence using the l1 norm of the difference
of successive POC probability estimations. Algorithm 1
describes this procedure and, as we will see in Section
5, one of its advantages is being easily parallelizable.
4.5 Convergence Given its many applications, such
as k-means clustering or expectation-maximization
methods, the convergence of alternating optimization
algorithms is a well studied problem and it is known
to work well in a surprising number of cases [3]. In
Algorithm 1 BreachRadar
Require: L, locations neighboring of each card
Require: N: cards neighboring each location
Require: ǫ: convergence threshold
Require: α, β: prior parameters
B← UniformBlames()
θ ← UpdatePOCProbabilities(B, N, α, β)
repeat
B← UpdateBlames(θ, L)
θprev ← θ
θ ← UpdatePOCProbabilities(B, N, α, β)
until ‖θ − θprev‖1 < ǫ
return (θ,B)
function UpdateBlames(θ, L)
for every card i do
sum←
∑
k∈Li
θk
for every location j ∈ Li do
bij ←
θj
sum
return B
function UpdatePOCProbabilities(B, N, α, β)
for every location j do
zj ←
∑
i bij
θj ←
zj+α
|Nj|+α+β
return θ
general, one cannot guarantee global convergence but
local convergence tends to be very fast. By using the
dataset and hyper-parameters described in Section 6, we
show empirically that our implementation of Algorithm
1 converges exponentially fast in Figure 3.
5 Distributed POC-detection
Both stages of the alternating optimization algorithm
are parallelizable if we assume a message-passing model
of computation, as used in Pregel [15] and other large-
scale graph processing systems. We assume that both
nodes and edges can store information which is shared
and updated until the whole system converges; in our
case, edges contain information relative to blames (B)
while location nodes contain their respective Point-of-
Compromise probability.
Under this new model of computation, the differ-
ences to Algorithm 1 can be summarized in Algorithm
2.
Implementation. In order to obtain an highly ef-
ficient parallel solution, this implementation was devel-
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Figure 3: Exponentially fast convergence - notice
the log scale in the y-axis.
oped using Apache Spark [23], a MapReduce engine that
enables in-memory computation. Spark is well suited
for machine learning algorithms as its in-memory model
doesn’t force sequential stages to synchronize data to
disk.
In particular, we rely on Spark’s GraphX [20] mod-
ule which overlays an abstraction for graph-parallel
computation that allows message passing and aggrega-
tion.
6 Results
We answer the following questions:
Q1. Effectiveness - How accurately and how early
can we detect Points-of-Compromise in reality?
What are the trade-offs?
Q2. Scalability - How does our method scale in terms
of the size of the network and in terms of the
number of machines available?
Q3. Fraud-cards precision and recall - How
much of the fraud that is reported can be ex-
plained through the identification of Points-of-
Compromise?
Q4. Discoveries - Can we identify real and validated
Points-of-Compromise in real data?
6.1 Experimental Setup BreachRadar was ap-
plied to two datasets provided by different sources, each
with over one billion transactions, 0.4 million cards and
2 million fraudulent transactions that cover more than
one year. The data is very unbalanced with the per-
centage of transaction fraud in accordance with industry
averages, between 0.01% and 0.1% [6]. Due to privacy
concerns, results in this section do not indicate the cor-
responding dataset.
We created possible POCs corresponding to
Algorithm 2 Distributed BreachRadar
G.POCs.onNewMessage(blame)
z = z + blame
Θ = z+α|Nj |+α+β
G.Cards.onNewMessage(θ)
sum = sum+ θ
function UpdateBlames(θ, N)
for each location j in G do in parallel
for each Card i in Nj do in parallel
j.sendMessage(i, θ)
// After all messages are aggregated.
for each Edge e in G do in parallel
e.blame = e.POC.θ
e.card.sum
function UpdatePOCProbabilities(G)
for each Edge e in G do in parallel
e.sendMessage(e.POC, e.blame)
terminal-week pairs and removed multi-edges and all
possible POCs that interacted with less than 5 fraud-
cards, as they could not be confidently labeled Points-
of-Compromise under any circumstance. After this
pre-processing stage, there were at least 1.5 million
terminal-week pairs that had to be considered in each
dataset. Results here reported correspond to a α = 0.2
and β = 15 prior which provides a significant assump-
tion that a random terminal-week is not compromised.
Results did not differ significantly with other values of
α and β we tested.
6.2 Empirical Evidence and Fraud Prevented
We collected significant empirical evidence demonstrat-
ing our ability to find real POCs, both data breaches
and terminals that we suspect were victims of skim-
ming, through manual analysis of the POCs reported.
The list includes tobacco machines equipped with credit
card readers and other general vending machines where
the percentage of fraud-cards is as high as 80%.
Data breaches are easier to validate as they are often
reported in the news; a non-exhaustive list of POCs
we automatically detected along with a sample news
report can be found in Table 3. We were also able to
identify POCs whose first news report occurred more
than 6 months after the last transaction available in the
dataset.
We evaluated the amount of fraud that could be
prevented if cards of likely-compromised POCs were
automatically reissued. Figure 1a shows the gains
Table 3: Several Points-of-Compromise identified in one of the datasets have also been mentioned in news reports.
Merchant Source Summary
Schnucks ComputerWorld [19] A supermarket chain where a breach exposed 2.4M cards.
NoMoreRack.com Reuters [17] An online retailer with over $340 million in sales annually,
probes likely card breach.
Jetro Cash &
Carry
DataBreaches [1] A data breach allowed attackers to access private data in cards
used over a one month period in this chain.
Bashah’s Family of
Stores
BankInfoSecurity [10] A supermarket chain tied to the compromise of hundreds of
cards.
Buy.com Yahoo Finance - Money
Talks [2]
Hundreds of online shoppers reported fraudulent charges on
their credit cards after making a purchase at this online
marketplace.
Table 4: Overview of the two datasets used. Specific
values masked for privacy.
#cards #trxs #buckets #fraud trxs
Dataset1 > 105 > 109 > 106 > 106
Dataset2 > 105 > 109 > 106 > 106
obtained when BreachRadar is evaluated in a 6 weeks
period. Over $2 million USD in savings would be
possible when reissuing all cards that interacted with
POCs with an expected compromise probability above
10%, even if we assume a $10 reissue cost per card. 17%
of the cards reissued would have been victims of fraud
and 95% of these would be first-time victims.
6.3 Accuracy and Early Detection Due to the
lack of ground-truth regarding which locations are ef-
fectively Points-of-Compromise, we evaluate the pre-
cision and recall of BreachRadar through the in-
jection of synthetic POCs in real data. We evaluate
BreachRadar along two dimensions:
1. Probability that a card is a victim of fraud after
using a compromised location (p). This can be
viewed as a proxy for how early our method is
able to detect compromised cards, as detection gets
naturally easier as the number of victims increases.
2. Presence of noise in the set of fraud-cards, i.e.,
we randomly mark additional cards as victims,
although fraud cannot be attributed to any of the
POCs.
In each experiment, we define a set of POCs and
vary a probability (p) that their transactions will steal
the corresponding card. Based on this new fraud-cards
list, we then obtain a new list of possible Points-of-
Compromise. Table 5 shows the number of fraud-cards
and possible Points-of-Compromise as the probability
of the card being stolen increases, when no noise is
included.
Table 5: Impact of the infection probability on the num-
ber of fraud-cards and possible Points-of-Compromise.
Probability (p) #fraud-cards #poss. POC
5% 29 326 104 185
10% 57 593 263 115
15% 84 833 450 609
20% 110955 662 967
25% 136896 892 119
50% 257609 2 168 733
Figures 4a and 4b show the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) and “precision vs recall” curves
for the different compromise probabilities. Note that
we are able to simultaneously achieve high precision and
recall for relatively small compromise probabilities; we
achieve over 90% precision and recall even when only
10% of the cards have been victims of fraud.
We also analyze the impact of noise in the effec-
tiveness of our method: we double the number of fraud-
cards by randomly selecting additional cards. These are
cards that do not have a corresponding POC in the data,
even though they were marked as victims. As before,
Figures 4c and 4d show the ROC and “precision vs re-
call” curves for the different compromise probabilities.
Using the same scenario of a 10% probability of cards
being compromised as example, note that we are still
able to achieve about 75% recall maintaining 50% pre-
cision, even though we are simultaneously considering
very aggressive levels of cards mislabeled as fraud-cards
and early detection.
6.4 Scalability Scalability experiments are per-
formed using the data described in Table 5. We show
BreachRadar linear scalability on the number of pos-
sible POCs (Figure 1c) and analyze the runtime of its
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.001  0.002  0.003  0.004  0.005
T
r
 






i


	




Fa s 
p ff fiflffi
  !"#
$ % &'(
) * +,-
. / 012
3 4 56
(a) Receiver Operating Curve: notice the very
low false positive rate.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
P
re
c
is
io
n
Recall
7 8 9:;
< = >?@
A B CDE
G H IJK
L M NOP
Q R ST
(b) High precision and recall, even with low
stealing probability (p).
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.005  0.01  0.015  0.02
T
ru
e
 P
o
s
it
iv
e
 R
a
te
False Positive Rate
p = 25%
p = 20%
p = 15%
p = 10%
p =   5%
(c) Receiver Operating Curve: low false posi-
tive rate, with 100% noise.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
U
V
W
X
Y
Z
[
\
]
Rec^_`
p = 25%
p = 20%
p = 15%
p = 10%
p =   5%
(d) Even with 100% added noise, high pre-
cision and recall.
Figure 4: Accuracy with varying probability of a card being a victim of fraud. (Top row: without noise. Bottom
row: 100% additional fraud-cards as noise.)
Spark implementation when changing the number of
machines available in a small cluster of 6 quad-core ma-
chines (Figure 5). The number of cores in each machine
does not provide any advantage, as disk input-output is
the bottleneck of our system, not processing power.
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Figure 5: Good distributed speed-up.
6.5 Comparison We compare the precision and re-
call of our method to (1) FaBP - Fast Belief Propaga-
tion [12]; (2) a greedy approximation of Vertex Cover
described in Section 2; (3) the ratio as proxy for POC
probability, as commonly used by previous methods and
(4) the ratio metric combined with the best prior found
for BreachRadar, in order to reduce its false positive
rate.
FaBP [12] is a fast approximation to Belief Prop-
agation with low sensitivity to input parameters. We
assigned a high prior belief (0.5) to fraud-card nodes,
a low prior belief (-0.1) to non-fraud-card nodes and a
neutral belief (0.0) to possible POC nodes. We then
decreasingly sort the possible POCs by their final be-
lief, creating the corresponding precision vs recall curve.
The curve for the other methods was created similarly,
based on the ordering of the possible POCs that they
explicitly define.
We compare all methods on the non-noise dataset
when considering a stealing probability of 10%.
As can be seen in Figure 1b, our method signifi-
cantly improves over all alternatives. Reasons have been
detailed in previous sections, but can be summarized
as a combination of appropriate priors and the focused
blame of the fraud-cards. Vertex Cover’s result shows
that focused blames are not sufficient, while the ratio
with prior’s result shows that removing false positives
with a small amount of fraud-cards is not enough either.
6.6 Reproducibility We make available the dataset
used in the comparison experiments described in Section
6.3, when requested by email to the authors.
7 Conclusion
We present, as far as the authors know, the first
distributed procedure for the automatic detection of
Points-of-Compromise in transaction networks. We
achieve highly accurate results through the implemen-
tation of an in-memory algorithm that updates POC
probabilities and blame scores alternatingly, and we
have demonstrated surprising empirical evidence in a
real dataset. Our main contributions are the following:
1. Point-of-Compromise Problem. We formulate
a novel and important POC detection problem.
2. Effectiveness. BreachRadar accurately identi-
fies Points-of-Compromise, achieving over 90% pre-
cision and recall when only 10% of the stolen cards
have been used in fraud (Figure 1b).
3. Distributed POC-Detection algorithm. We
provide a scalable distributed algorithm for POC
detection in big datasets (Figure 1c).
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